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Abstract
We investigate a simultaneous discrete public good provision game
with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and
Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games.
In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not
completed, while in the latter they are.
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In the presence of complete information about individuals' val-
uations for the public good, the di®erence between the equilibrium
outcomes of a subscription game and a contribution game is not sig-
ni¯cant. However, there is both casual evidence from the fund-raising
literature and experimental evidence that subscription games are \su-
perior ", i.e., a refund increases the chance of providing the good given
that it is e±cient to do so. Our analysis shows that this is indeed the
case in the presence of incomplete information.
We compute a symmetric equilibrium for the subscription game
and show that it is not necessarily e±cient. This ine±ciency stems
from the di±culties arising in coordinating to overcome the free-rider
problem in the presence of incomplete information. Although it is well
known that informational disparities impose limits on the e±ciency of
outcomes, the novel feature of our analysis is to explicitly model the
resulting trade-o® | when deciding how much to contribute towards
the public good | between increasing the likelihood of provision and
creating incentives for free-riding by the other player. Moreover, we
show that for the contribution game, \contributing zero" is the only
equilibrium for a given range of the ¯xed cost of provision and for a
family of distributions.
Keywords: Public goods, incomplete information, continuous distribution.
JEL: D8, H4.
1 Introduction
The literature on private provision of public goods can be divided into two
broad categories.1 The ¯rst branch of the literature focuses on the provision
of continuous public goods. Papers include Warr (1982, 1983), Bergstrom,
1In this paper, we focus on private provision. There is an extensive mechanism design
literature that treats public provision. Papers in this literature develop e±cient mecha-
nisms for the provision of public goods. These mechanisms are in general complex and
require a central authority to implement them and hence would be best decsribed as mecha-
nisms for public provision of public goods. Gradstein (1994) examines e±cient mechanisms
for discrete public goods. Other papers that treat public provision include Maskin (1977),
d'Aspremont and Varet (1979, 1982), Palfrey and Srivastava (1986). Cornelli (1996) ex-
amines an optimal mechanism for a monopolist which produces an excludable good that
has large ¯xed costs.
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Cornes and Sandler (1984), Blume and Varian (1986), Andreoni (1988),
Gradstein, Nitzan and Slutsky (1994) and others. A standard result in this
literature is that public goods are underprovided by voluntary contributions
due to free riding behavior.2 One might conjecture that the government can
solve this underprovision problem by providing some of the good and ¯nanc-
ing it by imposing taxes on contributors. However, Warr (1982) and Roberts
(1984), in two in°uential papers, show that government contributions result
in a dollar to dollar reduction in private contributions if the tax on con-
tributors does not change the set of contributing individuals. Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian (1986) show that the crowding out e®ect is only partial
if one allows for the taxes that pay for the government contribution to be
also collected from non contributors. Hence the literature suggests that un-
derprovision is a robust conclusion if the public good level is endogenously
determined by voluntary contributions.3
The second strand of the literature focuses on discrete public goods where
a ¯xed level of a public good is provided if enough contributions are collected
to cover its cost c. Otherwise, the good is not provided. Typical examples
include building a bridge, a library of a certain size, public radio fund raising
to ¯nance a certain program. In all of these examples, if enough money
is raised to cover the cost of the public good, then the good is provided,
otherwise the good is not provided.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) developed the ¯rst modern treatment of
private provision of discrete public goods. More speci¯cally they analyze
contribution and subscription games | to use the terminology of Admati and
Perry (1991) | for a discrete public good under complete information where
players' strategies are restricted to either contribute zero or an exogenous
positive amount. In a contribution game, contributions are not refunded if
the sum of the contributions does not cover the cost of the public good c,
2The free riding problem becomes worse in the presence of incomplete information.
Gradstein (1992) considers a dynamic model of private provision for a continuous public
good with incomplete information with the restriction that players either contribute zero
or an exogenous positive amount. He concludes that in addition to the standard under-
provision results, ine±ciency occurs because of a delay in contributions. This ine±ciency
does not disappear as the population becomes large.
3Andreoni (1997) analyzes the role of seed money in the presence of nonconvexities
in the production of the public good. He shows that a small amount of seed money can
generate a substantial amount of voluntary contributions.
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while in a subscription game players get their money back if the project is
not completed. An example of a subscription game can be given as follows.
The Wisconsin Governor has recently pledged $27 million in state bonds to
¯nance a new $72 million basketball arena on the condition that the rest of
the money be raised by private donations. (Andreoni, 1997). That is, the
Governor will provide $27 million as long as the remaining $45 million is
raised, otherwise the o®er is cancelled. Other examples can be found in the
fund-raising literature. Examples of contribution games include public radio
and TV fund-raising e®orts where contributors do not get their money back
if the program is not provided. Other examples of contributions games are
situations where contributions take the form of physical labor, in this case
volunteers cannot recover their e®ort if the project is not completed.
In contrast with the standard underprovision result for continuous pub-
lic goods, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) obtain the startling conclusion that
e±cient provision of a discrete public good is a robust equilibrium of both
contribution and subscription games. E±cient provision is rather intuitive
since the coordination problem becomes easier when the level of public good
is ¯xed and common knowledge to all the players. Bagnoli and Lipman
(1989) extend Palfrey and Rosenthal model by allowing individuals to make
continuous contributions. They show that the set of undominated perfect
equilibrium outcomes of the subscription game is not only e±cient but co-
incides with the core of the economy. They also show that with a dynamic
version of the subscription game, it is possible to obtain e±cient outcomes
even if the level of the public good is not binary as long as the number of
units of the public good is countable.4 It follows that the general conclusion
from the literature is that private provision of a discrete public good is in
general e±cient in the presence of complete information. Moreover, e±cient
provision is obtained for both subscription and contribution games. How-
ever, there is both casual evidence from the fund-raising literature of the
superiority of subscription games and experimental evidence from Bagnoli
and McKee (1991) and Cadsby and Maynes (1997) that a refund increases
the chance of providing the good. More speci¯cally, Cadsby and Maynes
4Admati and Perry (1991) consider a dynamic private provision model for a discrete
public good. They analyze contribution and subscription games in a Rubinstein type
framework with complete information where players alternate in making contributions to
the public good. They show that the equilibrium of the subscription game is e±cient while
the equilibrium of the contribution game is ine±cient.
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consider a discrete public goods experiment. They provide experimental ev-
idence showing that provision is encouraged in a subscription game vis-a-vis
a contribution game. They also provide evidence that a high c discourages
provision in the contribution game but not in the subscription game. Our
results will con¯rm these ¯ndings.
An important question that has not been addressed in the literature on
private provision of discrete public goods is to what extent these results
generalize to a model where players have incomplete information about other
players' valuation for the public good. Moreover the important issue of how to
measure departure from e±ciency in this incomplete information framework
has not been explored.5
In this paper, we address these issues. More speci¯cally, we analyze con-
tribution games and subscription games for a discrete public good in the
presence of incomplete information about preferences. Our model also re-
laxes the binary contribution restriction imposed in the literature.6 While
there are important instances where binary contributions are relevant due to
transaction costs, in general players can give any amount of money they desire
(alumni donation, donations to a library, etc. .). Moreover, in a continuous
contributions framework, individuals make contributions that best match
their preferences as opposed to a discrete contribution model. Cadsby and
Maynes (1997) provide experimental evidence showing that allowing contin-
uous rather than binary \all-or-nothing " contributions facilitates provision.
Within this framework, we ¯rst show that we no longer obtain e±ciency
when we introduce incomplete information. This ine±ciency stems from the
di±culties arising in coordinating to overcome the free-rider problem in the
presence of incomplete information. Although this type of ine±ciency is well
known in economic theory, we go beyond that by explicitly characterizing the
trade-o® involved when information is incomplete. We explicitly show the
5It is important to note that there are several papers that introduce incomplete in-
formation in one form or another but do not address the above questions. Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1988) analyze the provision of a discrete public good when individuals have
incomplete information about the degree of altruism of other players under the restriction
that players are only allowed to make discrete contributions. Nitzan and Romano (1990)
show that when the cost of the discrete public good is uncertain to the players, then
e±ciency is no longer obtained.
6Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) also considers continuous contributions. However their
model is with complete information.
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trade-o® between free riding behavior and the probability of provision of the
public good. Note that the individual problem of an individual deciding how
much to pledge is to forecast the lowest pledge one can make, given that it
is below one's value, and still have the good being provided. This is similar
but not the same as the problem of an individual deciding how much to bid
in a ¯rst-price auction who faces a trade-o® between pro¯ts conditional on
winning and the probability of winning.
Moreover, we measure how ine±cient the provision is and we are able to
do that since we are able to explicitly solve for the contribution functions of
the players. We also show the signi¯cant di®erence in the equilibrium out-
come between the contribution game and the subscription game in contrast
to the similarity obtained in the absence of incomplete information. This
reconciles the theory with the evidence from the experimental literature of
the superiority of subscription games over contribution games. In contrast to
the mechanism design literature, our approach of characterizing equilibrium
behavior in existing mechanisms enables us to provide results which can be
tested in a laboratory environment or by using empirical data.
2 The Model
Before we present the general model, consider the following simple exam-
ple with discrete distributions. Two players, 1 and 2, have the following
valuations for a threshold public good:
vi =
8><>:
0; with probability 1
2
1; with probability 1
2
; i = 1; 2
Valuations are private information. That is, each individual knows her
own valuation but only the distribution of her opponent's valuation. The
public good will be provided if the threshold 1 < c < 2 is met through
private contributions. The money contributed by both players is returned in
the event that the sum of the pledges is less than c. If the sum of contributions
is greater or equal than c, the good is provided but any resources above c
are not returned to individuals.7 This game has a symmetric Bayesian Nash
7This assumption is standard in the literature on discrete public goods. One can think
of the the excess as accruing as \pro¯ts" to the provider of the public good (Nitzan and
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equilibrium where an individual pledges $0 if her value is 0 and $ c
2
if her
value is 1.8 Note that in this equilibrium, the sum of the pledges never
exceeds c, individuals never pledge more than their values, and all equilibria
are e±cient, as the good is always provided whenever it is socially e±cient
to do so.
Consider now a contribution game where the contributions are not re-
turned to individuals when the threshold c is not met. Recall that 1 < c < 2:
We examine this game from the perspective of Player 1. (As the game is
symmetric, it does not really matter who we choose.) Player 1 will of course
contribute zero if her value is zero. The question is what will she contribute
if her value is equal to one. We can readily verify that the equilibrium of
the subscription game where each player contributes c
2
if her value is equal
to one and zero if her value is equal to zero does not emerge in this game. If
Player 2 follows this strategy, player 1 will make negative pro¯ts by following
it as well as her pro¯ts equal 1
2
¡ c
2
< 0 in this case. It follows (by symmetry)
that a player cannot contribute c
2
or more and make positive pro¯ts. (The
maximum any player could possibly contribute and make nonnegative pro¯ts
is clearly 1
2
· c
2
.) Therefore, the only pure strategy equilibrium of this game
is for both players to contribute zero no matter what their values are. That
is, the good is never provided in equilibrium.9 In this paper, we investigate
to what extent the intuition emerging from the above example generalizes to
Romano 1990).
8\Always pledge zero" is another symmetric equilibrium. This equilibrium is known in
the literature as the \strong free-riding equilibrium ". However this equilibrium involves
weakly dominated strategies. As with the game of complete information, this game has
in¯nitely many asymmetric equilibria both e±cient and ine±cient. In what follows we will
focus on symmetric equilibria since the game is completely symmetric.
9In the presence of complete information about individual's valuations for the public
good, the di®erence between the set of equilibria in a contribution game and the set
of equilibria in a subscription game is not signi¯cant. Consider a two-player provision
game, where both individuals value for the public good are equal to one. The public
good will be provided if the threshold 1 < c < 2 is met through private contributions {
any contributions above c are not returned to individuals. The subscription game has a
continuum of equilibria, which includes the pairs (0; 0), ("; ±) | where " and ± are such
that c¡ " > 1 and c ¡ ± > 1 | and all pairs of pledges (b1; b2) such that b1 + b2 = c;
b1 · 1 and b2 · 1: Note that the set of Nash equilibria of the contribution game coincides
with the set of Nash equilibria of the subscription games with the exception of the pairs of
pledges ("; ±) as described above. However the ("; ±) are weak in the sense that a player's
deviation from the equilibrium does not a®ect any player's payo®.
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a situation where each bidder believes her opponent's value can be any of a
continuum.
We now present the formal model. We consider an independent-private
values model where each individual i, i = 1; 2, knows her value for a certain
discrete public good but only the distribution of her opponent's value. That
is, each bidder i knows that her opponent has a value vj; j 6= i; that is drawn
from a distribution F (:) with positive density f (:) on the support [0; 1]. We
denote the cost of providing the public good by c. Whatever the method
to elicit donations is, the good is only provided if at least $c are donated.
If more than $c are donated, the additional money is not returned to the
contributors. We consider the case when c belongs to the interval [1,2], that
is, when a single player cannot provide the good by herself.
2.1 The Subscription Game
First we consider a subscription game where both players make pledges that
are only materialized if the threshold is met. Player 1's expected pro¯ts
given that she has a value v1, makes a pledge b1 and that Player 2 follows a
\pledging" strategy b2(v2) is
¼1(v1; b1; b2(v2)) = (v1 ¡ b1)Âb1+b2(v2)¸c: (1)
For the moment we will assume b2(v2) is nondecreasing and di®erentiable
in the relevant interval. Taking the inverse, we can rewrite the above expres-
sion as
¼1(v1; b1; b2(v2)) = (v1 ¡ b1) Pr
³
v2 ¸ b¡12 (c¡ b1)
´
: (2)
Player 1 chooses b1 in order to maximize her expected pro¯ts. The ¯rst-
order condition for an interior solution is given by
(v1 ¡ b1)
µ
f
³
b¡12 (c¡ b1)
´ ³
b¡12
´0
(c¡ b1)
¶
= 1¡ F
³
b¡12 (c¡ b1)
´
: (3)
We can now use the fact that we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium
where b1(:) = b2(:) = b(:) yielding the following di®erential equation
(v ¡ b(v))
µ
f
³
b¡1 (c¡ b(v))
´ ³
b¡1
´0
(c¡ b(v))
¶
= 1¡ F
³
b¡1 (c¡ b(v))
´
8
This di®erential equation does not admit an explicit solution for general
distribution functions. For the case of a uniform distribution on the interval
[0,1], the solution is:
b(v) =
2c¡ 1
6
+
v
2
(4)
Note, however, that in equilibrium a player may not follow b(v) for any
v in [0,1] as this may lead to pledging more than her value or more than the
cost of the public good. Hence we need to impose the following boundary
conditions
b(v) · c (b1)
b(v) · v (b2)
b(v) ¸ 0 (b3)
It turns out that (b1) and (b3) are not binding since c > 1: Condition
(b2) is binding as b(v) > v for v < 2c¡1
3
:
We now provide the intuition for equation (4). Recall that in a symmetric
equilibrium of a ¯rst-price sealed-bid auction | where the object is awarded
to the individual with the highest bid | an individual bids in such a way to
outbid the opponent with the highest value. That is, conditional on her value
being the highest, her bid is equal to the expected value of the ¯rst-order
statistics of her opponents.
In the subscription game, however, the good is provided to both players
if their contributions add up to the cost of provision. Thus, the problem
becomes one of forecasting the lowest pledge one can make, given that it is
below one's value, and still have the good being provided. Thus, (4) states
that Player 1, for example, pledges the equivalent to the expected value of
player 2 being lower than her own, conditional on the interval [ 2c¡1
3
; 1], that
is, on the interval where pledges are less than or equal to the values and add
up to c.
Notice the distinction between the solution of the subscription game and
the solution of the ¯rst-price auction. In the latter, if a bidder's value is not
the highest, then in any symmetric equilibrium with increasing bids she will
lose the object and therefore, in equilibrium, she does not have to consider
what she would do if her value is not the highest one. In the subscription
game this is not the case. If her value is the lowest of the two, she may still
obtain the object and, thus, following (4) guarantees that this is the minimum
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pledge so that the object is provided and the players are sharing the cost in
such way as to equalize their marginal contributions. This property of the
equilibrium pledging strategies is very distinct from the result for ¯rst-price
auctions and it captures the nature of the trade-o® between the probability
of the public good being provided and the free-riding behavior.
The next proposition characterizes a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium of
the subscription game.
Proposition 1 The following are symmetric equilibrium pledging strategies
for the subscription game with two players whose values are uniformly dis-
tributed on [0; 1] and c ¸ 1:
b¤(v) =
8<:
2c¡1
6
+ v
2
; if 2c¡1
3
· v · 1
0; otherwise
Proof: Given that Player 2 is following the proposed equilibrium pledging
strategy, we have to ¯nd the best response of player 1. We ¯rst show
that for 2c¡1
3
· v · 1; b1(v) = 2c¡16 + v2 is a best response to b¤(v2).
Player 1's expected pro¯t, if the bid is b; is given by
Á (b) = (v ¡ b) Pr (b+ b¤(v2) ¸ c) :
To ¯nd the maximum of Á ¯rst note that if 0 < c¡b < b¤
³
2c¡1
3
´
= 2c¡1
3
then Á (b) = (v ¡ b)
³
1¡ 2c¡1
3
´
·
³
v ¡ c+1
3
´ ³
1¡ 2c¡1
3
´
= Á
³
c+1
3
´
:
Note that if c¡b ¸ b¤ (1) then Á (b) = 0: Let us consider now c¡b¤ (1) <
b < c¡ b¤
³
2c¡1
3
´
: Then we have
Á (b) = (v ¡ b) Pr
µ½
v2 ¸ 2c¡ 1
3
; v2 ¸ 4c+ 1
3
¡ 2b
¾¶
=
(v ¡ b)
µ
1¡max
½
2c¡ 1
3
;
4c+ 1
3
¡ 2b
¾¶
:
There are two cases to consider:
a) 2c¡1
3
> 4c+1
3
¡ 2b
In this case Á (b) = (v ¡ b)
³
1¡ 2c¡1
3
´
< Á
³
c+1
3
´
:
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b) 2c¡1
3
· 4c+1
3
¡ 2b
In this case Á (b) = (v ¡ b)
³
1¡ 4c+1
3
+ 2b
´
: This quadratic
function has a unique maximum at b¤ = 2c¡1
6
+ v
2
: Thus b¤
is the optimal bid if b¤ 2
h
c¡ b (1) ; c¡ b
³
2c¡1
3
´i
and 2c¡1
3
·
4c+1
3
¡ 2b¤: The last inequality is valid for all v 2 [0; 1]: The
¯rst inequality is valid if v 2 [ 2c¡1
3
; 1]:
Thus b(v) = 2c¡1
6
+ v
2
is the best response to b¤(v2) if v 2 [ 2c¡13 ; 1]. To ¯nish
let us ¯nd the best response for v 2 [0; 2c¡1
3
): It is clear from the reasoning
in (b) above that the maximum of Á is not interior. Thus we need only to
compare Á (c¡ b¤ (1)) = Á
³
2c¡1
3
´
=
³
v ¡ 2c¡1
3
´ ³
1¡ 4c+1
3
+ 2 2c¡1
3
´
= 0 and
Á
³
c¡ b¤
³
2c¡1
3
´´
= Á
³
c+1
3
´
=
³
v ¡ c+1
3
´ ³
1¡ 2c¡1
3
´
< 0: Thus if v 2 [0; 2c¡1
3
)
the maximum expected utility is zero. Hence since bidding zero and bidding
2c¡1
3
gives the same expected pro¯t we ¯nished the proof that b (¢) is an
equilibrium.
Note that this proposition shows an equilibrium bidding strategy that is
increasing and di®erentiable in the relevant range and, therefore, our previous
analysis is justi¯ed.
We now provide a simple example to illustrate the analysis above.
Example 2 For simplicity, assume that the realizations of v1 and v2 are
both equal to 1
2
and that c = 1. The predicted symmetric equilibrium accord-
ing to Proposition 1 is for both players to pledge b¤(v) = 1
6
+ v
2
= 5
12
: Since
c = 1 ¸ 5
12
+ 5
12
, the good is not provided in this equilibrium, although it is
e±cient to do so once we know individuals' valuations.
Let us consider the game from Player 1's perspective and ¯nd what
is his best response to Player 2 playing the proposed equilibrium strategy
b¤(v2) =
(
1
6
+ v2
2
; if 1
3
· v2 · 1
0; otherwise
:
Player 1's expected pro¯t is given by:
¼1(
1
2
; b1; b
¤(v2)) =
µ
1
2
¡ b1
¶
Âb1+b¤(v2)¸1
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Maximizing with respect to b1 yields b1 =
5
12
as expected.
The above example illustrates that a subscription game may not be ex-
post e±cient, i.e., after we learn individuals' valuations. This is not really
surprising given some of the results listed in Section 2. In any case, perhaps
ex-post e±ciency is too strong a requirement. An alternative measure of
e±ciency is given below. It indicates the probability that the good will be
provided whenever is e±cient to do so.
Proposition 3 Pr (b¤(v1) + b¤(v2) ¸ c j v1 + v2 ¸ c) = 23
Proof. We need to compute
Pr (f(v1; v2) ; b¤(v1) + b¤(v2) ¸ c and v1 + v2 ¸ cg)
Pr (f(v1; v2) ; v1 + v2 ¸ cg)
Note that
Pr (f(v1; v2) ; b¤(v1) + b¤(v2) ¸ c and v1 + v2 ¸ cg) =
1
2
µ
4¡ 2c
3
¶2
+
µ
2c¡ 1
3
¡ (c¡ 1)
¶ µ
1¡ c+ 1
3
¶
=
4
3
¡ 4
3
c+
1
3
c2 =
1
3
(c¡ 2)2 :
Since Pr (f(v1; v2) ; v1 + v2 ¸ cg) = 12 (2¡ c)2 we ¯nish the proof.
Notice that an increase in c a®ects this probability by two opposing ef-
fects. An increase in c causes b(:) to increase but the interval for which
b(:) is di®erent from zero shrinks. The random variable v1 + v2 has a trian-
gular distribution (as the sum of two random variables that are uniformly
distributed). Its density peaks at c = 1. Beyond this point, these two oppos-
ing e®ects completely o®set each other as shown above. Therefore, a grant
towards reducing the cost of provision has no e®ect on the probability of
provision as it is perfectly o®set by individual's behavior in equilibrium.
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2.2 The Contribution Game
In this subsection we consider a game where both players make contributions
that are not refunded if the threshold is not met. Let's write Player 1's
expected pro¯ts given that she has a value v1, makes a pledge b1 and that
Player 2 follows a \pledging" strategy b2(v2)
¼1(v1; b1; b2(v2)) = v1Âb1+b2(v2)¸c ¡ b1 (5)
For the moment we will assume b2(v2) is nondecreasing and di®erentiable
in the relevant interval. Taking the inverse we can rewrite the above expres-
sion as
¼1(v1; b1; b2(v2)) = v1 Pr
³
v2 ¸ b¡12 (c ¡ b1)
´
¡ b1 (6)
For the uniform [0,1] distribution, (6) becomes
v1
³
1¡ b¡12 (c¡ b1)
´
¡ b1 (7)
Player 1 chooses b1 in order to maximize her expected pro¯ts. The ¯rst-
order condition for an interior solution is given by
v1
³
b¡12
´0
(c¡ b1) = 1 (8)
That is,
1
b02
³
b¡12 (c¡ b1)
´ = 1
v1
(9)
As we are looking for symmetric equilibrium, we set b1(:) = b2(:) = b(:):
b0
³
b¡1(c¡ b(v))
´
= v (10)
Contrarily to the subscription game case, we do not know whether this
di®erential equation has a solution. Even if the di®erential equation has a so-
lution, it may not be a solution to the problem given the relevant boundary
conditions. However, the next proposition shows that the strategy \con-
tributing zero" for both players is the only equilibrium for a family of distri-
butions and for 1 < c < 2:
Proposition 3 Suppose 1 < c < 2: If the distribution function satisfy either
F (x) ¸ x; x 2 (0; 1) or is concave then the best response to b2(v2) such
that b2 (v2) · v2 is b1 (v1) = 0 .
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Proof. De¯ne ¼(b) = vP (b2(v2) ¸ c¡ b)¡ b: If b > v then ¼ (b) · v¡ b < 0:
Thus to maximize ¼ necessarily b · v: Suppose b > 0: If b < c ¡ 1 then
¼(b) = v ¢0¡b = ¡b < 0: Suppose now c¡1 · b · v:We have ¼(c¡1) = ¡b
and ¼(v) · 0: Now:
¼(b) · vP (v2 ¸ c¡ b)¡ b = v(1¡ F (c¡ b))¡ b =: g(b):
First suppose F is concave: Then g is convex. Thus we conclude that
max
c¡1·b·v
g(b) = maxfg(c¡ 1); g(v)g < 0:
If F (x) ¸ x the reasoning is even simpler:
g(b) · v(1¡ (c¡ b))¡ b = v ¡ c+ (v ¡ 1)b:
Note that the above family of distributions includes many known distrib-
utions such as the uniform and the exponential distributions. Proposition 3
extends the intuition given in the example from the beginning of this section
to continuous distributions. That is, the coordination problem is so severe
in a contribution game that \contributing zero" is the only equilibrium.
3 Conclusion
A standard result in the literature on discrete public goods with complete
and perfect information is that private provision is e±cient. In this paper we
tested the robustness of this result to the information structure. We devel-
oped a model where individuals have incomplete information about other in-
dividuals' valuations for the public good. Within this framework, we showed
that the standard e±ciency result in the literature on voluntary provision of
discrete public goods no longer holds. Moreover, we explicitly analyzed the
trade-o® between free riding behavior and the probability of provision of the
public good. We measure how ine±cient the provision is and we are able to
do that since we are able to explicitly solve for the contribution functions of
the players.
Our analysis showed that there is a signi¯cant di®erence in the equi-
librium outcome between subscription and contribution games. This is in
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contrast with the literature with complete information where the two games
lead to essentially the same outcomes and it reconciles the theory with the
evidence from the experimental literature of the superiority of subscription
games over contribution games.
There are several issues that deserve additional research. Perhaps the
two most important issues are the investigation of individual behavior when
valuations for the public good are correlated and whether or not it is possible
to establish an optimal mechanism as one that maximizes some notion of ex-
post e±ciency like the one we use in this paper.
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